State of Utah v. James E. Travis : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. James E. Travis : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Larry R Keller; Attorney for Appellant.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation




IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF Ij¥fif6 
BRICHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben ClarJc Law School 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
[ Case No. 
[ 13834 
JAMES E. TRAVIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding. 
LARRY R. KELLER 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
343 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
VERNON B. ROMNEY
 fl y-"3 
Attorney General, State of Utah yf™* I ^ h** 
236 State Capitol ff* I 1 ^ ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah I y
 i q 7 r 
Attorney for Respondent. ftpR ( " ^ ! ° 
ClaS Supramn Court. Utah 
I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON APPEAL ................... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2, 8 
POINT I 
T H E TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY REFUS-
ING TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO 
CALL AS A WITNESS A CO-DE-
FENDANT FACING A SEPARATE 
TRIAL ON THE CHARGE MERELY 
BECAUSE THE CO-DEFENDANT 
INTENDED TO INVOKE HIS PRIV-
ILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION ..., 8 
POINT I I 
T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
REFUSING TO ADMIT INTO EVID-
ENCE T H E AFFIDAVIT MADE PRE-




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E O F CASES A N D A U T H O R I T I E S 
Page 
Gladneyv. U.S., 408 F.2d 903 (1969) 16 
Gowen v. Wilkerson, 364 F. Supp. 1043 
(U.S.D.C., W D . V.A. 1973) 9 
Hoffmanv.U:S., 341 U.S. 479, 
71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1950).. ......:...:... 12 
Mason v. U.S., 408 R.2d 903 (1969) 16 
New Jersey v. Jennings, 312 A.2d 864 (1972) ........ 14 
U.S. v, Allen, 409 F.2d 611 (1969) 16 
U.S. v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (1964) 10 
U.S. v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345 (1971) '."...'. 17 
S T A T U T E S C I T E D 
Utah Rules of Evidence (July 1,1971) 
Rule 62 (7) 17 
Rule 63 (2) , 18 
Rule 63 (10) .... . „„„„... 18 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, I 
... I Case No. 
' f 13834 
JAMES E. TRAVIS, V 
Defendant-Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE 
OF T H E CASE "• •'•'•"-'': 
This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery in 
the Third District Court for the State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, James E. Travis, was convicted by 
a jury of the crime of robbery on August 29, 1974, in 
the Court of the Honorable Jay E. Banks, and was 
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sentenced to serve the indeterminate term provided by 
law in the Utah State Prison, namely one to fifteen 
years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of 
guilt entered against him and a new trial in this matter. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The facts presented at trial were as follows: 
Robert Charles ZancaneUa testified that at ap-
vroximately 2:30 a.m. on June 26, 1974, he was in 
Radio City Lounge with Blair E. Roberts, the night 
bartender, who was cleaning up after closing the bar. 
ZancaneUa, who was waiting for a cab, heard a knock 
at the door, and upon opening the door he saw the ap-
pellant and William Kendrick. Hq further testified 
that the appellant asked if he could come in and use 
the phone to call the hospital because Mr, Robert's 
roommate, Duane Daniejs, had become ill. The two 
ttien pushed open the door and entered the bqir at the 
moment Mr. Roberts reached the door from the in-
side. ZancaneUa testified that appellant said, "Don't 
make a move," and pushed Roberts to the floor. The 
witness then testified that Kendrick struck him in the 
left side with something wooden such as a club, the 
same shape as State's exhibit No. 7. 
ZancaneUa testified on direct examination that ap-
2 
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pellant then took his wallet. (R. 119 1st day) On cross 
examination, however, he testified that Kendrick had 
taken it. (R. 138 1st day) Although previously un-
able to make a positive identification, the witness testi-
fied that it was appellant who went behind the bar and 
found the money. Shortly thereafter, the two men left. 
On cross examination, the witness testified that he 
heard one of the men say something to the effect of 
"What are you doing? Let's get out of here." (R. 140 
1st day) 
The police immediately arrived at the scene of the 
robbery and took the witness to the 1-80 overpass on 
20th East where he identified the appellant and Ken-
drick as the perpetrators of the crime. 
Helen Burns later testified that Zancanella had 
testified at preliminary hearing that it was Kendrick, 
and not the appellant, who first asked to use the phone 
and that the appellant didn't enter the bar until shortly 
thereafter. (R. 197-198 2nd day) She further testi-
fied that at preliminary Rearing, Zancanqjla testified 
that he could give positive identificaifion of Kend-
rick but only tentative identification of appellant, while 
on the 1-80 overpass and at trial he testified that he 
positively identified both of theni at that time. 
Blair Eldon Roberts, the bartender on duty on the 
night of June 25 and morning of June 26, 1974, testi-
fied that he was cleaing up the bar at approximately 
3 
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2:30 a.m. when he was summoned to the front door by 
Mr. Zaneanella who was waiting for a cab. He testified 
that it was the appellant who told him that Duane was 
sick, but at preliminary hearing he had been unable to 
ascertain which of the two had told him that. I t was at 
that point, he testified, that he got hit and fell to the 
floor. When he came to, Kendrick asked him for his 
money and he complied. On cross examination he testi-
fied that he heard one of the men say to the other 
"What are you doing? Stop that. Let's get out of 
here. Let's go Jack, we've done enough . . . damage 
in here." He testified that he never saw the appellant 
go behind the bar, and the only object he saw was a 
round wooden or metal container which stuck approxi-
mately 10 inches out of Kendrick's pocket. (IL 128-
129,2pdday) 
Officer W. G. Hatch testified that in response 
to;a dispatch at approximately 8:20.ami. on June.26, 
1974, he stopped the car in which appellant was riding. 
He further testified that co-defendant Kendrick was 
seated in the right rear seat, appellant was in the front 
passenger side and Lynn Rewe was driving* (R. 135-. 
15752ridday) ,..:•;. . ..:._ . ,.;;: 
^;;;.S.«r^eilt:.Glaytoii IS* Conger testified that on June; 
26, 1974 in the early morning hours, he went to 1-80 at; 
approximately 20th East where he searched the above 
mentioned car. He found a money bag under the right 
front seat containing $79.17 in coins. (R. 191-194, 2nd 
day) 
4 
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Officer Stephen JLi.a.mon*, testify •* ...... *irj*r»-\• 
mately 10:00 or 11:00 n.m. .»n J ' U I . •„'*;. t**T »-, b> 
searched ih« trailer arid rjn n: i f u < i ;ppellant and 
Kendrick were riding UIUMI tlu-\ WCK arretted. l i e 
f'.-und :« n«!I -V currency undei tin Vn h v/al and 
loose change on the front seat totaling $19:193, He 
also found a wrecking bar with an extension cord 
u ^ p p e d around it under the ruhher n^p- I>-«I* >J *iw. 
auver 's seat. (R, 174-183, 2nd day) 
.IMIH*> K. Travis testified that of ,MIP, J/I .*« » 
lu Lynn K< w» atui William Kendrick stopped i.> ^ -4 
*- 'hi di! \ <h s a ; i 1 A'* i" 'K . n e n i t e I M I U . ' 
Vngeles t<> \i w Jersev where emplovmeni awaited. 
The +hree had left Los Angeles in two cars, hut shortly 
after their departure, the appellant's ear had broken 
down. H e sold the car, rented a TVHaul trailer which 
Rewe and Kendrick agreed to pull with Itewe's car. 
Due tc proM< JUS will) th«- rai overheating, they planned 
to tra^ el at nigh* K. ?12-216, 2nd day) 
Th» appellant testified HrM they spent the day 
dning errundb in Salt Lake City and at approximately 
J 00 a.m. on J u n e 36, he, Kendrick and Rewe went 
into Radio City Lounge for a beer. There they met 
Duane Daniels who invited them to a par ty at his 
home, Travis testified that the three of them left the 
vtiili DrmeK w\ approximately 2:00 a.iiu A t Dan-
iels' house, Kendrick wjh upsef 1>\ homosexual advances 
made h\ n^-i i -h Consequent i\\ flic npprllnnt K 
5 
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drick and Re we immediately left the house to return 
to their motel. (R. 217-218) 
The appellant further testified that en route to the 
motel, while passing Radio City Lounge, Kendrick told 
Re we to stop the car so he could "get even with those 
faggots." (R. 220-222). He testified that when Ken-
drick got out of the car, he followed him, grabbed him 
by the arm and unsuccessfully tried to dissuade him 
from going back into the bar. (R. 223) Kendrick pro-
ceeded toward the bar and the appellant went back to 
the car. (R. 223) The appellant testified he then went 
to the Lounge to retrieve Kendrick and through a 
window in the door saw Kendrick hit the bartender, 
Mi\ Roberts, in the head with something. (R. 223-224) 
The appellant testified he immediately entered the bar 
and stepped in between Kendrick and Mr. Zancanella, 
preventing Kendrick from striking the latter. Kendrick 
instead hit the appellant once in the leg and once in the 
shoulder, causing it to bleed. He testified that he did 
not know what Kendrick hit him with, but it was some-
thing other than a fist. (R. 224) The appellant testi-
fied Kendrick temporarily disappeared from sight and 
he then told Mr. Roberts and. Mr. Zancanella to lay 
on the floor and he would not let Kendrick hurt them. 
(R. 225) He testified that when Kendrick reappeared, 
he grabbed him by the arm and said "Le t s get the hell 
out of here/' and went out the door of the lounge. The 
appellant testified he waited a few seconds and when 
Kendrick didn't appear, he went back inside, retrieved 
Kendrick, and the two men left together. (R. 225) 
6 
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The appellant testified the three then drove back 
to their motel and he suggested they pack their things 
to leave Salt Lake City. He testified Kendrick then 
produced some money and told the appellant it be-
longed partly to him. The appellant asked him where 
the money came from, and when Kendrick said he took 
it from the bar, the appellant refused to take any of it. 
(R. 226) Since they had intended to leave that night 
anyway, t^nd because of their trouble at the bar, they 
prepared to depart; Kendrick packed things in the car, 
and the appellant packed the U-Haul trailer, and 
hooked it to the car. (R. 227) 
The appellant further testified that as they left 
the motel for the freeway to leave the city, Mrs. Rewe 
was driving, he was riding in the front seat and Mr. 
Kendrick was riding in the back seat. (R. 228) The 
car was stopped by police officers on the freeway ramp 
to J-80 at 20th East. The appellant denied having seen 
the money bag or the pawn ticket prior to the trial. (R. 
228) The appellant also testified that the charges 
against Ms. Rewe had been dismissed and he had been 
unable to locate her to aid in his defense. 
Counsel for the appellant and the prosecutor 
agreed that if he had been available to testify, Officer 
Vaughn would have testified that shortly after the 
arrest, the officers questioning the appellant noticed a 
fresh cut on appellant's shoulder and blood stains on 
the inside right shoulder of his shirt. (R. 284, 2nd day). 
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In addition to testimony presented at trial, the 
attorney for appellant attempted to introduce into 
evidence a prior statement made under oath in open 
court by the co-defendant, William Kendrick. (R. 278-
279, 3rd day) The statement corroborated appellant's 
testimony and exonerated appellant from any criminal 
activity. This had been preceded by appellant's at-
torney's effort to call the co-defendant Kendrick as a 
witness in the case. Upon hearing that co-defendant 
Kendrick intended to refuse to testify on the grounds 
that his testimony might tend to incriminate him, Judge 
Banks refused to allow him to take the stand. (R. 208-
209, 2nd day) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L J U D G E C O M M I T T E D P R E -
J U D I C I A L E R R O R BY R E F U S I N G TO 
A L L O W A P P E L L A N T TO CALL AS A W I T -
N E S S A C O - D E F E N D A N T F A C I N G A SEP-
A R A T E T R I A L ON T H E C H A R G E M E R E L Y 
B E C A U S E . T H E C O - D E F E N D A N T I N T E N D -
E D TO I N V O K E H I S P R I V I L E G E A G A I N S T 
S E L F - I N C R I M I N A T I O N . . 
Although appellant and one William Kendrick 
were charged as co-defendants in the above-entitled 
matter, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, after an eviden-
tiary hearing and motion by attorneys for both defend-
8 
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ants, severed the charges and ruled that appellant was 
to be tried first. At appellant's trial, appellant's at-
torney called to the stand the former co-defendant 
Kendrick, not on trial at that time. After dismissing 
the jury, and before witness Kendrick took the stand, 
the Judge asked Kendrick and his attorney if Kendrick 
intended to testify. Kendrick stated he intended to ex-
ercise his privilege against self-incrimination. Upon 
learning this, the Judge dismissed Kendrick, and over 
the objection of appellant, refused to allow him to be 
called as a witness. (R. 208-210, 2nd day) 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination is available to any witness or accused in a 
criminal prosecution, however, it is a privilege which 
is not absolute. A common limitation which has been 
expressed by many courts is that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is by nature a personal privilege and there-
fore must be claimed by the individual involved. In 
addition, many courts, when faced with the question, 
have held the privilege must be raised with respect to 
specific questions and cannot be asserted as a blanket 
prohibition against inquiry. 
This position was explicitly state4 by the Court in 
Gowen v. WilkersQn, 364 Fed. Supp. 1043, (U.S. Dist. 
Gt., W.D. Va. 1973), a habeas corpus probeeding con-
testing a contempt conviction and sentence. The de-
fendant was called as an adverse witness to explain 
why he failed to make support payments to his wife. 
Since his testimony could also be used against him in a 
9 
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criminal prosecution, the defendant refused to answer 
any questions. The court refused to review the sentence 
since it was within the limits of the state statute; how-
ever the court stated the situation was such that al-
though the defendant was entitled to assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, he had raised the privilege im-
properly in this instance. 
But even if the danger of self-incrimination was 
great, petitioner's remedy was not to voice a 
blanket refused to testify, as his counsel inti-
mates was done, but rather to take the stand and 
as to each question elect to raise or not to raise 
the Fifth Amendment privilege. 364 F . Supp. 
at 1045. 
A similar position was enunciated by the Sixth 
Circuit in U.S. v. Harmon, 339 F.2d 354 (U.S. Ct. 
of Appeals ,6th Cir. 1964) where the defendant was 
convicted of embezzlement and conversion of union 
fuiids. In his appeal, the defendant claimed prejudicial 
error in the trial judge's ruling allowing counsel for 
the Government to call three witnesses who had stated, 
prior to being called, that they would refuse to testify 
on the grounds that it may incriminate thenio The Ap-
pellate Court found no prejudicial error and upheld the 
conviction. In its decision, the court stated: 
The privilege against self-incrimination may not 
be asserted in advance of questions actually pro-
pounded In no event may the witness refuse to 
be sworn. . . . We do not believe that the trial 
judge had the right to preclude either party 
10 
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from calling witnesses. The District Judge had 
the opportunity to pass upon the issue only 
when the witnesses were sworn and invoked their 
privilege. 339 F.2d at 359. 
The facts of the matter currently before the Court 
present a more blatant example of error by the Trial 
Judge than existed in the previously cited cases. In a 
voir dire examination of the co-defendant, out of the 
presence of the jury, the judge refused to allow ap-
pellant's attorney to call the co-defendant as a witness: 
(Jurors leave the room.) 
COURT: The record may show that Mr. Ken-
drick is in the room and he is represented by Mr. 
HousleVc Have you had a chance to talk with 
him about claiming the Fifth Amendment? 
MR. H O U S L E Y s I have your Honor. 
COURT: And have you advised him to claim 
the Fifth Amendment ? 
A. Yes sir, I have advised him and also to 
claim his rights under Rule 23, under the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
COURT i Mr. Kendrici;, if you were called to 
the stand and questioned about this incident, 
would you claim the Fifth Amendment ? 
. • " ;•" MR. KEMDRICKrYes sir, I would. . 
COURT: All right, you may remove him from 
the court room. 
MR. K E L L E R : Your Honor, if it please 
the Court, whether or not—if he claims the Fifth 
Amendment I believe I have a right to call him 
as a witness. He is not the accused in this trial. 
11 
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The accused is Mr. Travis. Now if he desires to 
take the Fifth Amendment there is nothing you 
can do about that, but certainly I have the right 
to call him and nothing that I know of says that 
I can't call him as a witness. 
COURT: That's right, but he indicated he 
will claim the Fifth Amendment. (R. 208-209) 
This blanket refusal by the trial judge to even 
allow co-defendant Kendrick to be sworn, constitutes 
a violation of the law established by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Harmon, supra, and 
the U.S. District Court for W.D. Va. in Gowen, supra. 
The prejudice of such error by a trial judge was dram-
atically illustrated by the United States Supreme Court 
in the landmark decision of Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 
479, 71 S.C. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1950). In that de-
cision the Court said: 
But this protection must be confined to instances 
where the witness has reasonable cause to appre-
hend danger from a direct answer. The witness 
is not exonerated f rorfi answering merely because 
he declares that in so doing he would incriminate 
himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the 
hazard of incrimijiatione I t is for the court to 
say whether his silence is justfied . . . and to re-
quire him to answer if 'it.dearly appears to the 
court that he is mistakep.' . . .. To.sustain the 
privilege, it need only be evident from the im-
plications of the question, in the setting in which 
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the ques-
tion or an explanation of why it cannot be an-
swered might be dangerous because injurious dis-
closure could result. The trial judge, in apprais-
12 
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ing the claim 'must be governed as much by his 
personal perception of the peculiarities of the 
case as by the facts actually in evidence. . .' 341 
U.S. at 486-487. 
In the matter before the Court, co-defendant Ken-
drick had given a prior statement under oath in support 
of his motion for a separate trial, as did defendant 
Travis. (See R. 336-340) In this statement, made to 
help the court determine whether or not a conflict be-
tween the defenses of the two defendants existed and 
therefore grounds for separate trials, Kendrick denied 
any criminal involvement on his part as to a robbery, 
and specifically exculpated Travis from any participa-
tion in or knowledge of a robbery. (R. 339) 
Prior to the time Kendrick made this statement, 
his counsel had admonished him that he was under oath 
and subject to penalty for perjury if he testified falsely. 
(R.336) 
Appellant maintains that at the very least, the 
trial judge should have allowed Kendrick to be called 
as a witness by appellant, and then the Judge should 
have made a determination with each individual ques-
tion as to whther or not Kendrick could assert his priv-
ilege against self-incriminatianc This becomes remark-
ably clear* iq. light of Kendrick's prior statement which 
the Judge could easily have concluded did not incrim-
inate him. The mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court 
is clear. I t is the trial judge's duty to determine 
whether or not a witness has "reasonable cause to ap-
13 
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prehend danger from a direct answer." Hoffman, 
supra. The substance of Kendrick's statement relating 
to appellant corroborates appellant's testimony at his 
own trial concerning his involvement in the incident; 
that appellant's participation consisted solely of ak 
tempting to prevent Kendrick from beating up the 
homosexuals in Radio City Lounge. Therefore, Ken-
drick's testimony was not incriminating and he was 
improperly excluded as a witness in appellant's trial. 
In the present case, co-defendant Kendrick's pre-
vious testimony tended to exonerate appellant from any 
participation in the robbery. Consequently, the trial 
judge's failure to inquire as to the substance of Mr. 
Kendrick's potential testimony and his refusal to allow 
Mr. Kendrick to take the stand constituted such pre-
judicial error that a new trial is mandated. 
Such a result was reached in N.J. v. Jennings, 312 
A.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. N.J. , Appellate Div. 8-30-72), 
where the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter 
by a jury . At a voir dire examination, (with the jury 
excused) of a key defense witness, the witness testified 
he had been with the defendant at the time of the kill-
ing and that the defendant had acted in selfTdefense„ 
The trial judge ruled the witness did not have to testify 
because it would tend tp incriminate him. TJie Court 
held that permitting a witness' Counsel to invoke the 
privilege for his client is reversible error. In ordering 
a new trial, the Court stated that if the witness were 
called at the new trial 
14 
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. . . the latter shall be required to take the stand 
before the jury, under oath (or affirmation), 
await specific questions, and either answer them 
or personally assert and demonstrate a basis for 
not doing so grounded in a claim of self-incrim-
ination. 312 A.2d at 868-869. 
In the present case, co-defendant Kendrick's Fifth 
Amendment privilege in no way would have been jeop-
ardized by his relating to the jury testimony he had 
previously given in open court. The excluded testi-
mony was exculpatory for the appellant and Mr. Kend-
rick was the only person with the knowledge of the 
situation to be able to support appellant's own testi-
mony. As a result, the erroneous exclusion withheld 
vital information from the jury and was highly pre-
judicial to the appellant. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D BY R E F U S -
I N G TO A D M I T I N T O E V I D E N C E T H E A F -
F I D A V I T M A D E P R E V I O U S L Y BY CO-DE-
F E N D A N T K E N D R I C K . 
At the hearing on the motion to sever the trials 
of-co-defendants. Kendrick ."and appellant, Mr. Ken-
drick, who was represented by counsel, made a state-
ment while under oath which tended to exculpate ap-
pellant. At appellant's trial Mr. Kendrick asserted his 
privilege against self-incrimination and on that basis 
15 
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the trial judge refused to allow him to be called as a 
defense witness. The U. S. Ct. of Appeals for the 10th 
Circuit has consistently held that when a witness in-
vokes his Fifth Amendment privilege he is considered 
"unavailable" and transcripts of his prior testimony 
will be admitted in corollary proceedings. Such was the 
result in U.S. v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611 (U. S. Ct. of 
Appeals, 10th Cir. 1969.) In that case witnesses had 
invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the Trial Court held that they were 
"unavailable" and admitted transcripts of their testi-
mony made at preliminary hearing. Affirming the 
Trial Court's decision, the Appellate Court said that: 
"the requirement of unavailability is satisfied when the 
witness is physically present but the testimony is un-
available because of the invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege." 409 F.2d at 613. The Court went on 
to say that transcripts of the witnesses' testimony at 
preliminary hearing could be used at tfie trial of the 
defendant and stated "that the test is the opportunity 
for full and complete cross examination rather than 
the use which is made of that opportunity." 409 F.2d 
at 613. 
A more persuasive pronouncement, made by the 
same court, is found in Mason v+. UM. and Gladney v.. 
U.Sc, 408 F.2d 903 (U.S. C t of Appeals, 10th Cir. 
1969.) In Mason the Trial Court permitted the use 
of witnesses' testimony in a prior trial to be admitted 
in a subsequent trial, after reversal and remand from 
the Circuit Court, where the witnesses invoked their 
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privilege against self-incrimination at the subsequent 
trial. The court stated that the controlling element 
under the rule which permits such testimony is "whether 
the testimony oi the witness is sought and is available 
and not whether the witness' body is available." 408 
F.2dat906. 
Further, in U.S. v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345 (U.S. 
Ct. of Appeals, 5th Cir. 1971) the court allowed the 
introduction of testimony from a previous trial where 
the witness asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at 
a subsequent trial stating that the witness "was no less 
available than he would have been at instances of death 
or absence of country or physical inability to speak." 
421 F.2d at 351. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence as adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court, effective July 1, 1971, also rec-
ognizes this interpretation of ^unavailable" in Rule 
62 (7). 
" 'Unavailable as a witness' includes situations 
where the witness is (a) exempted on the ground 
of privilege from testifying concerning the mat-
ter to which his statement is relevant'.••> .J> 
..Since co-defendant Kendrick, through his counsels 
told the trial judge that he intended to exercise his 
privilege against self-incrimination were he to be called 
as a witness, he should have been deemed "unavailable" 
for the purposes of that trial pursuant to Rule 62 (7). 
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Having concluded that Kendrick's insistence on 
his privilege against self-incrimination at appellant's 
trial makes him unavailable as a witness pursuant to 
the case law and the Utah Rules of Evidence, we turn 
to the issue of whether or not Kendrick's prior sworn 
statement in opeji court (R. 336-340) should have been 
admissable in appellant's trial. 
At trial, appellant's attorney moved to introduce 
Kendrick's prior affidavit or sworn statement in open 
court. (R. 278 3rd day.) The trial judge denied the 
motion and appellant properly objected and took ex-
ception to the court's ruling. (R. 279 3rd day.) Ap-
pellant contends that this affidavit was proper evidence 
under Rule 63 (2) which is the affidavit exception to 
the hearsay rule. I t states: "Affidavits to the extent 
admissible by the statutes and rules of this state" (as 
in Rule 43 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) 
are admissable as exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
I t was highly prjudicial not to allow into evidence 
the sworn statement made by co-defendant Kendrick 
because that statement was highly probative and essen-
tial to the defense of appellant Without any corrobor-
ation of appellant^ defense, his testimony lacked the 
credibility Mr. Kendrick's statement would have af-
forded it. The statement, had it been admitted, would 
have had the additional value of having been a declar-
ation against interest and therefore admissable under 
another exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 63 (10), 
since Mr. Kendrick admitted going into the bar for 
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the purpose of assaulting the occupants. He explained 
that appellant only then entered the bar in an effort to 
stop him. The jury could have more easily accepted 
appellant's testimony had Mr. Kendrick's statement 
been admitted as support for that testimony. The state-
ment made by Mr. Kendrick should have been intro-
duced to the jury for their evaluation of appellant's 
defense. I t was prejudicial not to allow the statement 
into evidence since it was the or*ly evidence which 
could have supported appellant's contention. Without 
it, the jury had to rely on appellant's word alone with-
out any corroboration. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, it is requested that the judg-
ment of the trial court be reversed and the defendant 
granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L A R R Y R. K E L L E R , 
Attorney for Appellant 
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